FUNDING OPTIONS IN DUTCH LONG-DISTANCE TRADE
are unlikely to have served as more than a temporary and incidental expedience. 18 For the first voyages to Italy, West Africa, and the Caribbean, reinvesting profits and widening partnerships, with active or sleeping partners, were the two principal funding strategies. At about 25,000 guilders per ship the outlay for such expeditions was hardly astronomical, well within the means of temporary partnerships. The Leiden merchant Daniel van der Meulen had a string of such ventures to Italy with three or four colleagues, whereas the Guinea trips in which Claes van Adrichem from Delft took part numbered even more participants.19 One of them counted 15 members, though the investment was similar in size and duration to Italian voyages. The rapid expansion of trade to Italy, West Africa, and the Caribbean suggests that finding capital and partners was no problem at all. During the 1590s an average of 12 ships a year sailed for Italy.20 The West African and Caribbean trades were a little slower to start, but both attracted at least 20 ships a year by 1600.
As West African trade grew, it spawned larger partnerships running more than just a single ship. Eventually this led to the establishment of more permanent companies selling equity shares.21 In Holland this partenrederij was common practice in economic sectors with large fixed investments, such as shipping and milling. In 1565 the Dutch Baltic fleet alone numbered 700 ships, often run by companies with part-ownership down to 1/32, 1/64 or 1/128th shares.22 Thus, a sizeable number of people must have been familiar with share-ownership. As a rule, one of the owners acted as bookkeeper-manager, charging a commission to the company for services rendered. Partenrederijen normally settled their accounts after each trip, the owners sharing profits and losses in proportion to their stake. In the seventeenth century, milling companies held regular meetings to brief shareholders about the results.23
We know far less about yet another funding option for long-distance trade: deposits and bonds. Any merchant firm would have interestpaying current accounts with its correspondents and thus possess some deposits. In addition, we may assume that businessmen would sometimes accept deposits from family members or close friends, as a cover against temporary shortfalls caused by business fluctuations or by family circumstances such as succession and estate arrangements, or as a favor to render cash surpluses profitable for someone without direct access to the market. Evidence for such deposits has to be drawn from the relevant business records. The ledgers of Hans Thijs, an Antwerp merchant who migrated to Amsterdam during the 1590s, suggest that deposits could supply a major part of funding. From 1592, when the estate of Thijs's father was finally wound up, Thijs had as a rule 10,000-20,000 guilders of family deposits at his disposal. At his death in 1611 deposits totaled 34,000 guilders on total assets of 255,000, or just over 13 percent.24 Daniel van der Meulens's 1600 estate had deposits of nearly 12,000 pounds Flemish on a total of 25,602 pounds, or 46 percent.25 Until we have more information about merchants' balance sheets, we simply cannot say what part deposits played in commercial firms overall.
Bonds also appear to have been used fairly widely. These IOUs, or bills obligatory as they were called, originated in rebates on the purchase of goods. They surfaced in the Low Countries during the fifteenth century. Herman van der Wee has shown how bills obligatory developed into negotiable bearer instruments in Antwerp.26 However, because IOUs carried a single signature, rather than the three that underpinned bills of exchange as an international negotiable instrument, their circulation is likely to have remained restricted to a fairly narrow circle of a merchant's direct or mediated acquaintances, i.e., persons who would know the debtor in person or accept his IOU on the 24 Gelderblom, Zuid-Nederlandse Kooplieden, p. 144. 25 Prinsen Lzn, "Notarisprotocol," pp. 163-64. 26 Van der Wee, "Anvers." pp. 1071-081; GAA NA (Amsterdam City Archives, Notarial Archives) 1/522, 12-07-1585; GAA NA 9/7, 28-01-1591; GAA NA 8/147v-148, 08-10-1591; GAA NA 8/200, 14-02-1592; GAA NA3/494, 31-03-1599. Dutch terms for debt instruments had not really crystallized at the time, as they appear to have done in England, where a clear distinction existed between obligations as bonds, in other words legally enforceable securities pledged to lenders, and obligations as private debt contracts, in other words informal promissory notes. See Postan, "Private Financial Instruments," pp. 35-37; and Trevor-Roper, "Elizabethan Aristocracy," 281-88. The Dutch term "obligatie" covered more or less any debt instrument ranging from private promissory notes to formal debt paper issued by city councils. We have preferred to use the term bond for formal debts embodied in a ledger entry or a formal document, rather than translating "obligatie" into the equally vague English term obligation. recommendation of a mutual friend.27 Consequently, such IOUs never developed into fully negotiable titles. This aspect made Van der Wee conclude that the instrument, though it continued to be used as a means of payment or caution money, contributed very little to the development of the Amsterdam capital market.28
However, from the 1540s onwards, merchants also issued IOUs to borrow money for periods up to 12 months.29 An article in the 1582 Antwerp Costuymen stipulated that both merchants and ordinary people could borrow money at 6.25 percent, under the condition that the maturity of the debt was stipulated in the bill.30 In the Dutch Republic IOUs were also used to raise money.31 Amsterdam notarial deeds from the early 1580s reveal bills obligatory issued by private individuals. The city of Amsterdam issued IOUs from the 1590s onwards, for debts ranging from 600 to 3,000 guilders that ran for any period of time between three and 12 months.32
The first explicit reference to IOUs as a means to fund commercial enterprise comes from the 1594 estate of an Amsterdam broker.33 In a notarial deed from the year 1608, two merchants and a broker described in detail the workings of a private credit market built around IOUs. Their testimony suggests an intensive use of such bonds amongst merchants, based on a set of customs about conditions and terms presumably derived from the Antwerp Costuymen, as the regulations on bills of exchange were. Rolling over bills on expiry for period of up to two years, sometimes even longer, appears to have been common.34 27 Postan, "Private," pp. 57-58; and Van der Wee, "Monetary systems," p. 301. Compare, for example, the cession of 25 bills obligatory signed by various merchants from the Antwerp merchant Wouter de Schot to his brother-in-law, Balthasar Jacot, also a merchant from Antwerp GAA NA 3/494, 31-03-1599. 28 Van der Wee, "Anvers," pp. 1080-81. 29Van der Wee, Growth; and De Smedt, "Antwerpen." Technically one should make a distinction between deposits and bonds. Whereas a lender could recover the former at short notice, a few weeks at most, the latter had a fixed maturity with an option for renewal. De Roover, "Anvers," pp. Evidence for the use of bills obligatory is not limited to legal provisions dealing with them. The Thijs ledgers suggest that bonds were indeed sufficiently common to offer a sound and flexible funding option. During his early career in Poland, Thijs set up his jewelry trade relying on funds supplied by private investors on IOUs for a total of up to 10,000 guilders. We have seen how he switched to using family deposits from 1592, but six years later Thijs again began to seek additional funding by borrowing heavily on the market. Until the autumn of 1602 he wrote IOUs to 24 different creditors, for a total of 30,000 guilders. The bonds covered amounts of up to 4,200 guilders at 7-8 percent interest and a maturity of three to 12 months; many of them were rolled over on expiry. On Thijs's death in 1611, bonds totaled 100,580 guilders or almost 40 percent of total assets.35 The 1620 estate of the Antwerp 6migre merchant Paulus Bosschaert shows a similar preponderance of bonds.36
In brief, available traditional methods of business organization and finance possessed sufficient scope and stretch to power the increasingly capital-intensive ventures in Europe, to Africa, and into the Caribbean. The next step, Asia, posed a formidable challenge, however.
FINANCING THE ASIAN TRADE
From 1595 onwards, expeditions to Asia changed the demand for capital in three key respects. First, at 100,000 guilders per ship, the sums needed were two to four times the amount of trips to, say, Africa or the Caribbean.37 Such demands were beyond the means of both individual merchants and traditional associations with a limited number of partners. Second, the distance and time involved multiplied risk; during the pioneering years 1595-1601, more than 20 percent of ships sent out to Asia were lost.38 Third, capital would remain tied up for a much longer period because round trips to Asia took about two years to complete. Investors might then expect a first and sometimes generous dividend, but that was not the end of it. Several of the pioneering Asian voyages took ten to 15 years to wind up. Presumably the accumulated products and assets could not be liquidated easily; some pioneer companies became investment trusts, shareholders deciding to lend the , who claimed that the voorcompagnien differed from both the partenrederij and the VOC in that the directors had an obligation to provide additional funds in case the companies ran a deficit. However, the evidence for this claim (Mansvelt, Rechtsvorm, p. 47) is thin and inconclusive. The one case in which the directors of a voorcompagnie were asked to supply additional capital, and did so without asking for contributions from their sub-shareholders, might very well be explained by their desire or willingness to raise their own stakes in a very profitable venture. In any case, the Thijs ledgers suggest that sub-shareholders could be asked (or volunteered) to raise the value of their shares whilst preparations for a voyage were underway (BT 119, Ledger Hans Thijs, 1598-1603, fol. 28, 88). Moreover, the claim about unlimited liability runs counter to the fact, established by Mansvelt himself, that all shareholders in partenrederijen, including the directors, bore limited liability: their share in profits and losses was proportional to their investment, and they never stood to lose more than the capital they invested (Mansvelt, Rechtsvorm, pp. 28-38). Even if the rules governing the relationship between individual participants and "their" director differed from the rules that governed the association between directors that constituted a voorcompagnie, the limited liability of all involved was secured. For maritime law allowed investors in partenrederijfen (in other words the directors of the early companies) to abandon their part in case their losses exceeded initial investment, while customary law stipulated that participants in any company never risked more than their investment (Mansvelt, To finance these commitments Hans Thijs reinvested profits, borrowed money, and sold a third of his shares in shipping and colonial companies to his father-in-law. As for the borrowing of money, Amsterdam's market for bonds proved sufficiently viable for Thijs to bypass his first source of credit, family members. Although deposits of relatives remained at about 10,000 guilders, by August 1602 Thijs had sold 30,000 guilders' worth of bonds to 24 different merchants and merchants' widows ( Figure 2) . Clearly, the money market helped Thijs to raise additional funds, and we may safely assume that other participants in colonial companies did the same to finance their investments. With buyers of bonds accepting a safe return of 7 percent to 8 percent on their savings, these investors were able to pursue the much higher expected returns from colonial trade.
The evolving pattern of trade with Asia led to a merger of the various pioneer companies into the VOC in the autumn of 1602. Even though various pioneer voyages were still underway, the flotation of the VOC went smoothly with share subscriptions amounting to 6.4 million guilders. Just below half of this capital was supplied by Middelburg, Rotterdam, Delft, Hoorn, and Enkhuizen together. The Amsterdam chamber alone raised over 3.6 million guilders in shares. As before, the company directors operated as underwriters canvassing buyers. However, the investment market had developed so rapidly that this device had lost much of its importance: only 29 percent of the capital at the Amsterdam chamber was subscribed in this way, so most savers could be reached without recourse to personal relations.44
Undoubtedly, many merchants who had invested in the pioneering voyages used their revenues to buy shares in the East India Company. Hans Thijs, for example, subscribed for 12,000 guilders in August 1602, 
THE RISE OF A SECONDARY MARKET
The pioneering voyages taught two important lessons about the longdistance trade to Asia. First, the scale of operations would have to be bigger, requiring substantially more investment in ships and staff; second, operations would have to assume some form of permanence, for only a lasting concern with stores, yards, fortifications etc. would be able to gain a competitive edge over the English and the Portuguese. To meet these requirements, the new company stipulated that shareholders pledge their capital for a period of ten years. As a corollary, the shares were made transferable by clauses laying down a procedure for transferring ownership by matching entries in the company ledgers. Shareholders could now liquidate their holding as and when required, so these provisions in effect created a secondary market in VOC shares. 51 Until then the market for equity claims had remained rather thin. Before 1602 very few participants in shipping companies and colonial companies sold their interests. Trade in parten and in shares in the early Asian ventures was limited to a narrow circle of insiders, i.e., a dozen or perhaps two in the case of shipping companies, and a few dozen in the case of the voorcompagnieen. For others, gathering information about the true state of affairs was simply too complicated. The shares in the early colonial companies were thus not very liquid, that is to say, they were not easy to sell at any given moment when the holder might bearer was drafted for this purpose by the company directors on 28 February 1603 (fol. 57). Thus much earlier than in 1621, as was suggested by Smith, (Tijd-affaires, p. 47). 48 The VOC effected a radical change in three respects. First, the spread of share-ownership was much wider than ever before. The Amsterdam chamber had more than 1,100 initial subscribers on an estimated adult population of no more than 50,000 people. The huge profits of some Asian expeditions had created a keen public interest, to the point of attracting even small savers investing up to 150 guilders. Second, the charter's clear rules about ownership and transfer of shares fulfilled key requirements for a transparent market.54 The VOC did not issue written or printed shares to subscribers, but entered their pledge in a share register that served as proof of ownership. All transfers had to be effected through matching entries made in the presence of two board members, with a small charge serving as remuneration for the bookkeepers.55 Ascertaining ownership was sufficiently easy to forestall the use of formal paper share certificates, turning the VOC shares into recognizable assets for any interested investor.56
However, the chore and cost of transfer via the VOC office did have unforeseen consequences, as will become clear from discussing the third point: because subscribers had a period of several years in which to pay up their commitment, the VOC shares had a built-in speculative element from the start. Several merchants subscribed to more shares in the new company than they were planning to hold on to. Reinforced by the ever fluctuating prospects of trade, this element provided a natural breeding ground for forward trading, which the hassle of transferring ownership did little to diminish, because it created an incentive to buy or sell for future delivery and then complete the transaction by mutual 52 This is not to say that shares in the voorcompagniecn could not be transferred, as Van The liquidity squeeze encountered by some of the shareholders is exemplified by the case of Pieter Lintgens, the single biggest investor in the VOC with subscriptions of 60,000 guilders in the Amsterdam chamber and another 45,000 guilders in the Zeeland chamber. This position was clearly a speculative one, i.e., Lintgens did not have the money in 1602 but expected to fund his commitment from future earnings and rising stock prices. This strategy no doubt built on the observation that most of the voorcompagniecn had begun to pay dividends about two years after the expeditions had sailed. Following these precedents, a first VOC dividend might justifiably be expected in the spring of 1605, by the time when the second call fell due. Lintgens managed to meet the first call by spreading his payments in three installments, but he could not meet the next payment. Thus, in April 1605 he sold half his share in the Amsterdam chamber. Just before the third call in December 1605 he sold his remaining stock, for there were no dividend payments whatever on the horizon.68
Although only seven shareholders bought and sold stock more than ten times between 1603 and 1607, in the next five years their number rose to 57. Total turnover of shareholders buying and selling their stock quadrupled from 0,5 to 2 million guilders (Table 1) . Among these speculative traders were six members of the oldest documented bear syndicate, led by former VOC director Isaac Lemaire.69 This combine of ten merchants attempted to push down share prices with the aim of forcing the company board to change its policy.70 The exposure of the dealings of Lemaire in 1610 has led historians to highlight his speculative trading as a unique phenomenon. The sheer volume of share transfers belies this. Indeed, the bear syndicate almost appears to have been a sideshow, for during 1608/09 its volume of transfers amounted to less than 20 percent of all transfers registered by the Amsterdam Chamber, and the share dropped to 11 percent during 1610 Consequently, merchants were keen to use alternatives to evade these complications. Public debt issues provided one obvious vehicle. However, two of the three main varieties then common, life and term annuities, had a clear drawback in generally being made out to named persons. Transfer was cumbersome and subject to a special tax, which limited the usefulness of these securities as collateral. The third form, obligations or bonds, suffered no such handicaps. Intended as shortterm credit paper, they ran for three to six months and could be either to 75 The Thijs ledgers demonstrate that at least this merchant quickly realized the advantages of using VOC shares as loan collateral. Thijs began to circulate IOUs in 1598 to finance the expansion of his business, including investments in the voorcompagniein (see Figure 2) . From 1602 onwards there is a clear relationship between Thijs's borrowing on the money market and the amount of VOC shares he owned. Figure 4 shows his debts and the value of shares as a percentage of the outstanding IOUs, the bottom line taking the shares at nominal value, the top line taking them at market price, i.e., multiplied by the nearest price data available. The data show that Hans Thijs's debts rose in tandem with his share holdings, which suggests he used the shares as collateral.
Until the summer of 1605, Thijs used this method prudently, his 26,000 guilders' worth of shares covering no more than 20-30 percent of debts. By the summer of 1605, this ratio had risen to 40-50 percent, at which it remained stable until the summer of 1608, when Thijs's debts peaked at about 70,000 guilders. He used part of this money to buy additional shares, raising his VOC stake from 26,000 guilders to more than 40,000 guilders in 1609, simultaneously reducing his debt to around 60,000 guilders. This brought the ratio of debt to nominal share value to 75 percent by the end of 1609.
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FIGURE 4 HANS THIJS'S IOU DEBTS (RIGHT SCALE) AND HIS VOC SHARES AS

A REVOLUTION COMPLETED
The rapid development of a secondary market in company shares more or less coincided with the emergence of new patterns in public finance amounting to the creation of a secondary market in public debt. By the 1590s the States of Holland found that life and term annuities, issued on the security of tax revenues, no longer sufficed to finance its needs as the war with Spain imposed ever rising burdens. The States began selling bonds as short-term expediencies, initially for small amounts and directly to merchants. Within a decade or so a regular system of sales through tax receivers and loan contractors had developed. Because the bonds were regularly rolled over on expiry rather than redeemed, this debt rapidly became medium-to long-term in fact, if not in intention. Bonds were made out to bearer and could thus be transferred more easily than annuities, which were made out to named persons and subject to a transfer fee. By 1609 an estimated four million guilders had been raised in this way, a substantial amount but still only a fraction of the States' debt. In 1618 the amount of bearer bonds issued stood at 5.2 million guilders, or 20 percent of the total debt.95 The States continued to prefer annuities, and only reluctantly gave in to market demand for bearer bonds. By 1650 the ratio of annuities to bearer bonds was still 40:60.96 Over time, the rising amount of public bonds in circulation would to all likelihood have engendered an increasingly lively secondary market of the sort Dickson described for Britain. As things happened, the introduction of VOC shares moved developments into a higher gear. The prospects of speculative gains without serious loss of liquidity created a booming secondary market offering a wide range of allied credit techniques.
Thus, the course of events in Holland after 1600 runs counter to common opinion about the importance of a publicly traded government debt as the origin of secondary markets. The VOC shares provided the crucial breakthrough, not government bonds. As a matter of fact, though, the secondary market itself resulted from a fortuitous conjunction between public and private finance. On the one hand it was preceded by decades of carefully managed public debt issues. By the 1580s annuities were sufficiently well established to serve as trusted instruments for a diverse public, including merchants, widows, orphans, and charity institutions.97 On the other hand, the early introduction of IOUs in Antwerp had trained merchants and investors in the use of private debt instruments, while partenrederijen had pioneered the legal concepts of limited liability and transferability of shares. In short, VOC shares only found rapid and widespread acceptance after 1602 because of the prior establishment of trust in paper claims and, presumably, a rudimentary trade in them. However, when they did, VOC shares provided the catalyst, creating securities trading, forwards and futures, and a range of credit techniques more or less from scratch. In as much as public securities were traded and used as loan collateral before 1602, they lacked the speculative element that created the secondary market for VOC shares, and thus could never have given such a market the kiss of life.98
Finally, the precocious development of the Amsterdam securities market as documented by us does raise the pressing question why its evolution subsequently seems to have stalled. The VOC did not capitalize on the opportunities created. Until the company's demise in 95 The references numbered 2-6 do not explicitly mention the interest rate paid on IOUs. Rather, merchants added the interest to the principal in one entry. However, because principals always were round figure (900, 1,200, 1,500, 2,400, and so on) 
